【关键词】 碳关税 碳泄漏 可计算一般均衡 竞争力 Carbon Motivated Border Tax Carbon Leakage Computable General Equilibrium Model Competitiveness

　　【基金】新华都商学院能源经济与低碳发展研究院的低碳项目教育部重大项目（10JZD0018）国家自然科学基金（71203186，1173170）中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金（2010221051、2010221096）

　　【摘 要】 2012年1月，欧盟将航空业纳入碳交易体系，意味着碳关税正式付诸实践。由于巨大的二氧化碳排放量和排放增量，中国将会受到碳关税问题的冲击。然而，碳关税可以降低中国二氧化碳排放量，能源税、碳税等措施同样也可以降低中国二氧化碳排放量。那么，哪种碳减排措施是更为有效的碳减排工具？换句话讲，碳关税是不是一个有效的碳减排工具，在碳减排问题上是否具有合理性？本文采用多国CGE模型进行分析，试图回答这些问题。结果表明，碳关税与碳关税等效措施的影响存在显著差异。相比较而言，碳关税会导致较高的碳减排成本，较高的碳泄漏率，对世界二氧化碳减排的贡献相对较小。因而，碳关税不具有合理性。不过，碳关税却是有效的威胁手段，因为它可以迫使发展中国家采用碳减排措施。 Carbon motivated border tax(CMBT for sho rt)came into practice when EU levied airline carbon tax in January 2012.Due to large carbon emissions and incremental carbon emissions, China would face the challenge of CMBT. CMBT could reduce China's carbon emissions, and energy tax or carbon tax(termed as CMBT-emission-equivalent policies)in China could also reduce carbon emissions. Then, which policy option would be more effective to reduce carbon emissions? Put it differently, could carbon emissions reduction justify CMBT? The paper applies a multination CGE trying to analyze and answer these questions. Our simulation results based on CGE model indicate that there would be significant differences in the effects between CMBT and CMBT-emission-equivalent policies. Compared to CMBT-emission-equivalent policies, CMBT would be more costly in reducing carbon emissions, resulting in high carbon leakage rate, and contribute less to world's emission reduction. Therefore, carbon emissions reduciton alone will not justify CMBT. However, CMBT could function as an effective coercive measure to force developing economies to accept carbon emission reduction targets and apply more carbon reduction policy measures.